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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Even though this action was filed in the Sixth Judicial 
District Court in February of 1985, no answer was ever entered by 
the defendants. Rather the defendants1 attorney made a special 
appearance and asked the court to dismiss on the basis that the 
action filed in the Sixth Judicial District Court was the same 
•as one filed in the Fourth Judicial District. The plaintiff 
responded in a Memorandum in Opposition to the defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss, arguing that the cases were quite distinct and 
outlining the issues in the case he had filed in counter 
distinction with those named in the Fourth Judicial District. The 
latter case was one which had been filed by DAVIS and DYER, as the 
plaintiffs, against HATCH, as the defendant. 
In spite of the fact that the issues as outlined were 
entirely distinct and separate and that one of the causes of 
action cited was for quiet title and that the quiet title could 
only be obtained in the county in which the real property is 
located, the lower court judge granted the defendants1 Motion to 
Dismiss on the basis that the two cases were the same! His order 
of dismissal was granted on the 8th day of October 1985. This 
appeal was filed on the 18th day of October 1985. 
RELIEF ON APPEAL 
The appellant asks the lower court's Order of Dismissal 
be vacated and the case remanded. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
For several years, HATCH has served REDC as its general 
partner. The limited partnership has as its major asset a large 
tract of recreation land in Kane County, south of Cedar Breaks 
National Monument. The land was purchased on highly leveraged 
terms in 1971. It was projected that property sales would produce 
the capital necessary to fund the payments. However, this was 
seldom the case. As a result, there were several years when 
HATCH was required to raise the money needed, often out of his own 
funds. 
As a result, when the trust deed note was finally paid 
off, the limited partnership owed HATCH considerable sums of 
money. As soon as the property was free and clear, and no longer 
in financial jeopardy, certain of the limited partners, namely 
DAVIS and DYER, sought to force the liquidation of the partnership 
assets in order to get a return of their investment capital. 
HATCH, the general partner, resisted their attempts at a forced 
liquidation, preferring an orderly liquidation. At the same time, 
HATCH asserted the right to be reimbursed for monies advanced to 
the partnership by himself and others. 
DAVIS and DYER sued for "conflict of interest, breach of 
fiduciary, self-dealing" and failure to provide regular financial 
statements. They also asked the Fourth Judicial District Court 
for a distribution of the partnership assets. 
A jury trial was held in May of 1984 before a judge of 
the Fourth Judicial District Court, but to date no judgement has 
ever been entered. Nor have any findings of fact or conclusion of 
law been prepared, much less entered. 
While no determination whatsoever was made, or even 
asked for, as to the right of the respective parties to control 
the partnership, the respondents DAVIS and DYER have presumed to 
act for the partnership since the trial even though the appellant 
HATCH is still the general partner of record! Their acts include 
the sale of partnership property, without so much as an accounting 
of the proceeds of sale to HATCH or the other partners. 
Based on these actions by the respondents DAVIS and 
DYER, all of which have occurred since the trial was had in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court, HATCH brought action against them 
in the Sixth Judicial Court for an accounting, for an injunction 
against them from acting as the general partners for REDC, for a 
return of money due HATCH by the partnership, for an order by the 
court confirming the priority of distribution as outlined in the 
general partnership agreement, and for an order quieting title to 
the real property belonging to the partnership. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In the lower court, the attorney for the defendants, 
DAVIS and DYER, had argued lack of jurisdiction based on the 
assertion that the same issues were currently pending in another 
district. In his Order of Dismissal, Judge Tibbs agreed with that 
assertion. He apparently failed to compare the two cases- In 
truth, the only thing which was the same were the parties. Even 
in that instance, the roles were reversed (the plaintiff parties 
in the first action being sued as defendants in the second 
action). 
However, the point of greatest significance is that the 
matters being complained of in the second action had not even 
occurred when a trial was had in the first action. Furthermore, 
one of the reliefs being sought in the action subject to this 
review is a quieting of title to the real property owned by the 
partnership. This can only be done in the county in which the 
real property lies. See Utah Code annotated (1953), Section 
78-13-1 of the Judicial Code. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE ISSUES IN THIS LAWSUIT ARE CLEARLY NOT THOSE IN 
THE CASE PENDING BEFORE THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT. 
In our Statement of Facts, paragraph three, we cited the 
five causes of action brought by the respondents, DAVIS and DYER, 
in the initial action in the Fourth Judicial District Court. In 
our final paragraph under Statement of Facts, we have recited the 
five causes of action brought by the appellant, HATCH. None of 
these issues is the same as those issues in the previous case. 
All of the issues raised by the appellant, HATCH, have become 
matters for litigation because of the actions of the respondents, 
DAVIS and DYER, since the earlier case was tried. 
The right of the appellant, HATCH, to pursue these 
causes of action is so clearly supported by the rule, Section 
78-11-8 of the Judicial Code, Utah Code annotated (1953), that 
further authority hardly needs mentioning. However, we shall cite 
Mitchell v Spanish Fork West Field Irrigation Co. (Utah, 1954): 
Where it did not appear that subject matter and 
issues were the same, action was not barred by 
action pending in same district court involving 
same parties. (265 P. 2d 1016) 
We might also cite a Nevada case on the same point, 
Volpert v. Papagna (1967): 
Cause of action must be same before a pending suit 
may abate one subsequently commenced. (433 P. 2d 533) 
POINT II: THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, AND IT ALONE, 
HAS PROPER JURISDICTION IN THIS MATTER BECAUSE IT 
INVOLVES A QUIETING OF TITLE. 
The Utah Judicial Code provides that an action "for the 
recovery of real property or of an estate or interest therein, or 
for the determination in any form of such right or interest...must 
be tried in the county in which the subject of the action is 
situated." See Utah Code annotated (1953), Section 78-13-1. 
CONCLUSION 
It was error for Judge Tibbs to grant Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss based on "improper venue" since any action involving 
quiet title must be filed in the county where the real property is 
located. The fact that a case is pending in Utah County involving 
the same parties has no relevance since the issues in the two 
cases are distinct and the matters which gave rise to the second 
action have arisen since a trial in the first action. Clearly, 
Judge Tibbs' Order of Dismissal should be set aside and the case 
remanded. 
DATED this 11th day of December, 1985. 
'dfrfafl. 
oward F. H a ^ h , Pro se 
ADDENDUM "A 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR COUNTY OF KANE 
STATE OF UTAH 
HOWARD F. HATCH, 
Plaintlff
' ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
-vs- CIVIL NO. 2046 
R. CRAWFORD DAVIS, WILLIAM 
G. DYER, individually and as 
General Partners for REAL ESTATE 
DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS, 
Defendants 
The Defendants Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of 
improper Venue=and that case between the same parties is pending 
in Utah County=is Granted. 
Dated t h i s " Qr-^jay /fff^October, 1985. 
\» . v1J3L 
D0N>>JIBBS 
DISTRICT Jtf9G£. 
- C-EWI-F-ICATE -GF-MILING 
Mailed a copy of the above Order to the following, postage 
prepaid from offices at Manti, Utah: 
Howard F. Hatch, Pro se, P.O. Box 190, Provo, Utah, 84603 
Michael E. Dyer, Attorney for Defendants, CSB Tower, Suite 700 
50 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84110 
Dated this A day of October, 1985 
Carole B. Mel lor 
Trial Court Executive 
ADDENDUM " B 
78-11-8 JUDICIAL CODE 
Master ' s l iabi l i ty for injury to or death 
of person, or damage to property, result-
ing from tire allegedly caused by servant ' s 
smoking, 20 A. L. R.'lM 89.'?. 
Measure of damages for death in action 
for benefit of decedent 's es ta te , 163 A. 
L . R. 253. 
Modern s ta tus of rule denying a com-
mon-law recovery for wrongful death, 61 
A. L. R. 3d 906.' 
Owner's or keeper 's l iabil i ty for personal 
injury or death inflicted l>v wild animal , 
21 A. L. R. 3d 003. 
Pension, re t i rement income, social se-
cur i ty payments , and the like, of deceased, 
as affecting recovery in wrongful death 
action, 81 A. L. R. 2d 949. 
Proof of prospective earning capaci ty of 
s tudent or t ra inee, or of i t s loss, in action 
for personal injury or death, 15 A. L. R. 
2d 418. 
Recovery of nominal damages in wrong-
ful death action, 69 A. L. R. 2d 628. 
Recovery of pre judgment in teres t on 
wrongful death damages, 96 A. L. R. 2d 
1104. 
Res ipsa loquitor in actions agains t 
owner or occupant of premises for personal 
injury, death, or proper ty damage caused 
by fire, 8 A. L. R. 3d 974. 
Right of action for injury to or death 
of woman who consented to illegal abor-
tion, 36 A. L. R. 3d 630. 
Right of action for wrongful death as 
subject to claims of creditors, 35 A. L. R. 
2d 1443. 
Right of personal representa t ive ap-
pointed at the forum or in a jurisdict ion 
where decedent was domiciled or where 
the tor t occurred, to main ta in action for 
death under foreign s t a tu t e which pro-
vides tha t action shall be brought by 
executor or adminis t ra tor , 85 A. L. R. 
1231, 52 A. L. R. 2d 1016. 
Right of subst i tut ion of successive per-
sonal representa t ives as par tv plaintiff, 
164 A. Ij. R. 702. 
Right to mainta in action for wrongful 
death for benefit of nonresident aliens, 
138 A. L. R. 684. 
Right to mainta in direct action against 
fellow employee for injury or death cov-
ered by workmen's compensation, 21 A. 
L. R. 3d 845. 
Right to recover for death result ing 
from emotional d is turbance, in absence of 
impact or other act ionable wrong, 64 A. 
L. R. 2d 100. 
Venue of wrongful death action, 36 
A. L. R. 2d 1146. 
Wrongful death damages for loss of 
expectancy of inher i tance from decedent, 
91 A. L. R. 2d 477. 
Law Reviews. 
Note, A Pr imer on Damages under the 
Utah Wrongful Death and Survival Stat-
utes, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 519. 
DECISIONS U N D E R F O R M E R LAW 
Person entitled to sue. 
Former 104-3-11 expressly s ta ted who 
should br ing the ac t ion; accordingly, it 
was not necessary to have recourse to 
former 104-3-1 or any other section to 
determine tha t mat ter . Johanson v. Cuda-
hy Packing Co., 107 U. 114, 152 P. 2d 98. 
78-11-8. Successive actions on same contract—When permitted.—Suc-
cessive actions may be maintained upon the same contract or transaction 
whenever, after a former action, a new cause of action arises therefrom. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-11-8. 
Collateral References. 
Action<$=>53(3). 
1 C.J.S. Actions § 103. 
1 Am. Ju r . 2d 647 et seq., Actions § 127 
ct seq. 
Simultaneous injury to person and prop-
er ty as giving rise to single cause of ac-
tion, 62 A. L. R. 2d 977. 
Single cause of action rule as affecting 
r ights and remedies of proper ty insurer 
as against third person tort-feasor who 
has sett led with insured, 92 A. L. R. 2d 
147. 
78-11-9. Repealed. 
Repeal. 
Section 78-11-9 (L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 
1943, Supp., 104-11-15), re la t ing to consent 
of the s ta te to be sued in certain cases in-
volving real and peisonal property , was 
repealed by Laws 1971, ch. 211, § 1." 
78-11-10. Actions against officers—Costs and attorneys' fees.—Before 
any action may be filed against any sheriff, constable, peace officer, state 
166 
ADDENDUM "C" 
PLACE OF TRIAL—VENUE 7 8 - 1 3 - 1 
hee (ubcs in the t w o ) car statute of him Collateral References, 
tations, and providing fo. a separate trial
 L l m l t a t l 0 n 0 f Aetiona*»176 et seq. 
in these cases of the statute of limitations
 5 3 c j s L i m i t a t l 0 n a o f A c t l 0 n s M§ 3 9 8 . 
i s s u e - L . 1971, eh. 212.
 5 1 A m # J u r 2 d 9 4 3 ) L l m l t a t l 0 n J A c . 
Cross Reference. t l o n s §§ 4 8 7» ias-
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, lim-
itation section, 78-14-4. 
CHAPTER 13 
PLACE OP TRIAL—VENUE 
Section 78-13-1. Actions respecting real property. 
78-13-2. Actions to recover hues or penalties—Against public officers. 
78-13-3. Actions against a county. 
78-13-4. Actions on written contracts. 
78-13-5. Transitory actions—Residence of corporations. 
78-13-6. Arising without this state in favor ot resident. 
78-13-7. All other actions. 
78-13-8. Change of venue—Conditions precedent. 
78-13-9. Grounds. 
78-13-10. Court to which transfer is to be m ide 
78-13-11. Duty of clerk—Fees and costs—Litect on jurisdiction. 
78-13-1. Actions respecting real property.—Actions for the following 
causes must be tried in the county in which the subject of the action, 
or some part thereof, is situated, subject to the power of the court to 
change the place of trial as provided in thib Code: 
(1) For the recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest 
therein, or for the determination in any form of such right or interest, 
and for injuries to real property. 
(2) For the partition of real property. 
(3) For the foreclosure of all hens and mortgages on real property. 
Where the real property is situated partly in one county and partly 
in another, the plaintiff may select either of the counties, and the county 
so selected is the proper county for the trial of such action. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1 ; C. 1943, limited and restricted to those which the 
Supp., 104-13-1. act itself excepts from the general rule. 
Buckle v Ogdeu Fuinituie & Carpet Co, 
Compiler's Notes.
 0 i u 559, 210 P. 084, construing former 
This section is identical to former sec- statute 
tion 104-4-1 (Code 1943) which was re-
pealed by Laws 1951, ch. 58, § 3. Constitutionality. 
Predecessor section was not inconsistent 
Gross-Reference.
 W l t h Const Art. VIII, § 5 Sherman v. 
Defense of improper venue, Rules of Droubay, 27 U 47, 74 P 348, Snyder v. 
Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b), (d) . Pike, 30 U. 102, 83 P 692. 
Construction. Extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
Tly giving a sensible and effective mean- Pecice which undertook to adjudicate 
ing to ail the piovisions of this act, and water rights beyond jurisdiction of court, 
considering them together, only rational held void on its face Albion Idaho Land 
conclusion is that legislature intended to Co v Nat Irr Co, 97 T. 2d 439, applying 
establish the general right of persons sued former statute, 
to have the action tried in the county 
where one of them resides, and that ac- Mortgage foreclosure, 
turns which may be tried elsewhere are Under this section action to foreclose 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing were hand delivered or mailed to the attorney for the 
Defendants by first class mail, postage prepaid, this 11th day of 
December, 1985 and addressed as follows: 
Mr. Michael D. Dyer 
CSB Tower 
Suite 700 
50 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Howard F. Hatch 
